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The objective of this study is to examine the relation between complex ownership structures and 
managerial compensation. More specifically, we examine the impact of the owner-manager’s 
excess control and the presence of multiple large shareholders (MLS) on the owner-manager’s 
compensation. Using a sample of French publicly listed firms, the results reveal several important 
points. First, the owner-manager’s compensation increases with the owner-manager’s excess 
control. This finding indicates that managers use their power to increase their pay, hence 
expropriating minority shareholders. Second, the presence of MLS decreases managerial 
opportunism and prevents owner-managers from diverting corporate resources for their own 
benefit. Hence, MLS play an important monitoring role. 
 
 





anagerial compensation has recently been a topic of great interest to practitioners and academic 
researchers (Firth et al., 2010; Gao et al., 2012). Interest in this topic has further escalated after the 
many financial scandals that erupted in major financial markets around the world (e.g., Enron 
(2001), Parmalat (2003), Worldcom (2006)), which raised considerable controversy surrounding the level of 
managerial compensation. These controversies are particularly concerning the existence of a mismatch between 
manager performance and remuneration (Benson and Davidson, 2010), as well as the unjustified increase in this 
remuneration (Broye and Moulin, 2010; Chen et al., 2011). To reduce this mismatch, some countries have attempted 
to regulate managerial compensation by, among other measures, requiring the disclosure of all CEO compensation 
components. France enacted a law on new economic regulations (NER, 2001) and a financial security law (FSL, 
2003). These laws represent a first step toward transparency in CEO compensation. French firms are now required to 
disclose full information on the compensation of their officers, to reduce their tendency to consume private benefits 
in the form of salaries at the expense of minority shareholders. 
 
Extraction of private benefits of control is more pronounced in civil law countries featuring weak 
protection of minority shareholders (La Porta et al., 1998).
1
 In these countries, such as France, concentrated–
ownership firms dominate the economic landscape and agency problems between large and minority shareholders 
are prevalent. Moreover, these firms exhibit substantial divergence between insider voting rights and cash flow 
rights, which is maintained through different control-enhancing mechanisms, such as multiple voting shares. A high 
degree of separation of voting rights and cash-flow rights (i.e., excess control) gives insiders incentive to extract 
private benefits of control at the expense of minority shareholders (Johnson et al., 2000). Masulis et al. (2009) find a 
                                                 
1 Claessens et al. (2000) and Faccio and Lang (2002) questioned the findings of Berle and Means (1932), who indicated the large 
widespread dispersed ownership structures. These authors provide evidence that the equity capital of listed firms throughout the 
world is not widely held outside the United Kingdom and the United States. 
M 
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positive and statistically significant relation between insiders’ excess control and managerial compensation in the 
Unites States. This result indicates that managers with higher excess control become entrenched, which gives them 
incentives to divert corporate resources through compensation. The Masulis et al. (2009) results contradict the 
findings of Barontini and Bozzi (2010), who provide evidence that managerial compensation is negatively related to 
excess control, implying that managers with higher excess control act in the interest of minority shareholders. 
 
A number of recent studies emphasize the governance role of multiple large shareholders (MLS) in curbing 
the consumption of private benefits of control, which mitigates agency problems between insiders and minority 
shareholders (Maury and Pajuste, 2005; Laeven and Levine, 2008). These studies show that the existence of MLS, 
beyond the largest controlling owner, increases firm value (Maury and Pajuste, 2005; Laeven and Levine, 2008) and 
reduces the cost of equity (Attig et al., 2008). In addition, the existence of MLS has been shown to significantly 
affect earnings informativeness (Fan and Wong, 2002), information asymmetry and stock liquidity (Attig et al., 
2006), the extent of analyst following (Boubaker and Labegorre, 2008), and the cost of debt (Guedhami and Mishra, 
2009; Lin et al., 2011). Maury and Pajuste (2005) and Laeven and Levine (2008) lend support to the hypothesis that 
the presence of MLS with evenly distributed equity holdings is an effective corporate governance mechanism. 
 
The objective of the present study is to analyze managerial compensation in the presence of a complex 
ownership structure in France. More specifically, it examines the governance role of MLS on owner-manager’s 
pay
2
. Thus, we begin by focusing on the impact of the owner-manager’s excess control on the owner-manager’s 
compensation. Then, we discuss the effect of the existence of one or more controlling shareholders on this 
compensation. 
 
This work has several implications for the current debate on the determinants of managerial compensation. 
First, it has the advantage of focusing on the French context. On the one hand, France is characterized by a relatively 
weak legal system and, thus, a low investor protection environment, which gives rise to expropriation of minority 
shareholders (La Porta et al., 1999). Typically, French listed firms have a concentrated ownership structure and are 
controlled through various control-enhancing mechanisms, such as dual-class shares and pyramidal structures. These 
mechanisms allow the ultimate owners to control their firms while holding only a small fraction of the cash flow 
rights (Faccio and Lang, 2002; Boubaker and Labégorre, 2008). The separation of ownership and control may result 
in severe agency conflicts between large and minority shareholders, which enhances the possibility of extracting 
private benefits of control. On the other hand, the present study is among the first to examine the impact of the 
owner-manager’s excess control on the owner-manager’s compensation in France. 
 
Second, to the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to investigate the impact of MLS on managerial 
compensation. Previous studies have shown that ownership structure is an important determinant of managerial 
compensation by focusing on the role of dominant shareholders. Large shareholders are able to closely monitor 
managers to curb their opportunistic behavior and to reduce their compensation. This argument implies the existence 
of a negative relation between the presence of more than one large shareholder and owner-manager compensation 
(Goldberg and Idson, 1995; Conyon and He, 2011), whereas other researchers preclude the existence of such a 
relationship (Su et al., 2011). The role of large shareholders is similar to the role of institutional investors in 
reducing excessive CEO compensation (Hartzell and Starks, 2003). Given that institutional investors are mainly 
interested in performance, one could expect a positive effect from these investors on the sensitivity of compensation 
to performance (Clay, 2000). The link between compensation and the presence of other types of shareholders is also 
investigated in the literature. The presence of financial institutions is shown to have a negative impact on 
compensation, while the presence of families has a positive impact (Amoako-Adu and Smith, 2011). 
 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops the hypotheses. Section 3 describes 
sample selection, data sources, and the adopted methodology. Section 4 presents the results. Section 5 describes our 
conclusions. 
 
                                                 
2 The terms CEO and owner-managers are used interchangeably in the text. 
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2. HYPOTHESES 
 
2.1. Effect Of Excess Control On Owner-Manager Compensation 
 
Excess control by an owner-manager reflects the degree of separation between owner-manager control and 
cash flow rights. Control-enhancing mechanisms (e.g., pyramiding and dual-class shares) create such separation by 
allowing the largest controlling shareholders to control their firms while having only a small fraction of cash flow 
rights (Bebchuk et al., 2000). These mechanisms reinforce and entrench the power of the owner-manager, which 
provides the owner-manager with strong incentives to extract private benefits of control at the expense of minority 
shareholders (Grossman and Hart, 1988; Claessens et al., 2002). In this vein, Claessens et al. (2002) and Boubaker 
(2007), among others, show that the greater the separation between voting rights and cash flow rights, the lower are 
the incentives for the largest controlling shareholder to run firms properly and the stronger are the incentives to 
consume private benefits of control (e.g., perks, perquisites, excessive compensation, etc.). 
 
However, the effect of excess control on managerial compensation remains a matter of debate. Previous 
studies have shown that the separation between control and cash flow rights of the controlling shareholder may have 
a positive (Masulis et al., 2009) or a negative (Barontini and Bozzi, 2010) effect on managerial compensation. The 
positive effect may be attributed to the ability of entrenched owner-managers to shift their firm’s pay decisions 
toward higher compensation. Nevertheless, the negative effect may be explained by owner-manager concern about 
their reputation when there is substantial excess control. Thus, they prefer to improve firm performance and to set 
fair compensation for themselves. 
 
In France, concentrated-ownership firms dominate the economic landscape. They are often run by members 
of controlling families, whose voting rights often exceed their cash flow rights (Faccio et al., 2001; Boubaker, 2007; 
Boubaker and Labégorre, 2008). Thus, French listed firms are typically vulnerable to severe agency conflicts 
between their owner-managers and minority shareholders. Accordingly, we expect that entrenched owner-managers 
of these firms have the incentives and power to consume private benefits of control by increasing their compensation 
(Masulis et al., 2009). Hence, we formulate the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Owner-manager compensation increases with the separation of voting rights and cash-flow rights of 
the owner-manager. 
 
2.2. Effect Of MLS On Owner-Manager Compensation 
 
The corporate governance literature offers two theoretical views on the role of MLS in corporate 
governance. According to one view, MLS may have incentive to expropriate minority shareholders. Zwiebel (1995) 
argues that MLS may collude with other shareholders to extract private benefits of control. Kahn and Winton (1998) 
argue that large shareholders may adopt opportunistic behavior by preferring to trade on private information rather 
than curbing the consumption of private benefits by corporate insiders. 
 
The second view is based on the idea that MLS have the incentive (substantial cash flow rights) and power 
(substantial voting rights) to monitor the owner-manager (Bennedsen and Wolfenzon, 2000; Bloch and Hege, 2003). 
Laeven and Levine (2008) find that more than 40% of the European firms in their sample have more than one large 
shareholder holding at least 10% of voting rights. These authors provide evidence that MLS play an effective 
governance role in curbing misuse of corporate resources, which results in higher firm valuations. In the same vein, 
Maury and Pajuste (2005) show that the presence of MLS mitigates expropriation by the controlling owner, 
especially when MLS hold evenly distributed voting rights, which increases firm value. According to Bloch and 
Hege (2003), the presence of two large shareholders reduces the possibility of diversion of corporate resources, as 
these shareholders prefer to compete for corporate control to attract minority shareholders rather than extracting 
private benefits of control. Faccio et al. (2001) find that the presence of MLS is associated with lower expropriation 
by controlling owners, which results in higher dividend payouts in European firms. Bennedsen and Wolfenzon 
(2000) and Pagano and Röell (1998) argue that MLS can play an important governance role in mitigating agency 
problems between the controlling owner and minority shareholders. Moreover, results in Attig et al. (2011) indicate 
that the presence of MLS improves internal governance, resulting in higher value for firm cash holdings. 
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We expect that the presence of MLS, beyond the largest controlling owner, has an impact on managerial 
compensation. As mentioned above, a growing number of theoretical and empirical studies show that MLS are able 
to prevent the owner-manager from adopting opportunistic behavior that leads to diversion of corporate resources 
(e.g., Bloch and Hege, 2003; Attig et al., 2011; Boubaker and Sami, 2011). Hence, we draw the following 
hypothesis: 
 




This section describes the sample selection procedure, data sources, empirical model and the variables used in 
the analysis. 
 
3.1. Sample Selection And Data Sources 
 
The initial sample includes all French listed firms available in the Worldscope database over the period 
2004–2007. First, we exclude financial firms (SIC codes 6000-6999) and firms with missing financial, ownership, or 
compensation data. Further, we discard firms that experienced a departure of a CEO (succession, retirement, 
dismissal, and death) during the sample period. We are left with 459 non-financial firms with 1,476 firm-year 
observations over the period 2004–2007. 
 
Data on CEO compensation, ownership, and board characteristics are gathered from firm annual reports 
available from the websites of the AMF (Autorité des Marchés Financiers).
3
 Financial data are gathered from the 
Worldscope database. Financial variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels to mitigate the effects of outliers 
on the results. Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of all variables used in this study. 
 
3.2. Model And Measurement Of Variables 
 
3.2.1. Model Specification 
 
To examine the effect of owner-manager excess control and relative power on owner-manager 
compensation, we consider the following model: 
 
CeoCompi,t = β0 + β1 ExControli,t + β2 MLSDi,t + β3 BoardSizei,t + β4 Dualityi,t + β5 IndDiri,t  + β6 CompComi,t   
+ β7 CeoAgei,t + β8 CeoTeni,t + β9 CeoFoni,t + β10 FirmSizei,t + β11 ROAi,t + Industry Dummies + Year Dummies + εi,t 
 
which we estimate using a pooled ordinary least squares regression with industry and year fixed. The t-statistics are 
calculated using heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors that cluster at the firm level. 
 
3.2.2. CEO Compensation 
 
We use two measures of CEO compensation (CeoComp), namely total CEO compensation and variable 
CEO compensation (Core et al., 1999; Chalmers et al., 2006). Total compensation of the CEO (TotCeoComp) 
includes all components of compensation, that is, fixed, bonus, stock options, and granted stocks. The variable 
portion of compensation excludes the fixed portion. 
 
3.2.3. Ownership Variables 
 
The owner-manager’s excess control is a proxy for the degree of separation of cash flow rights and voting 
rights. We follow the approach of Claessens et al. (2000, 2002) and Faccio and Lang (2002) to compute, for each 
concentrated ownership firm in our sample, the ultimate cash flow and control rights of its owner-manager.
4
 The 
                                                 
3 Autorité des Marchés Financiers Financiers (AMF) is the French equivalent of the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). 
4 See, La Porta et al. (1999), Claessens et al. (2000, 2002), and Faccio and Lang (2002). 
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excess control of the owner-manager “ExControl” is the difference between the owner-manager’s ultimate cash flow 
and ultimate control rights, all divided by the owner-manager’s ultimate control rights. We consider that a firm has 
an owner-manager when this individual holds directly and indirectly at least 10% of the voting rights of the firm.
 5,6
 
MLSD is a dummy variable that is set to 1 if the firm has at least one external blockholder that controls, directly or 




3.2.4. Control Variables 
 
Board size (BoardSize): The board of directors plays an important role in monitoring managers. However, 
as the size of the board increases, the actions of managers become more difficult to control, which allows managers 
to benefit from larger compensation. Several studies conclude that managerial compensation is higher when boards 
are large (Core et al., 1999; Ozkan, 2007). Thus, we include in our regressions BoardSize, which equals the natural 
logarithm of the number of directors on the board. 
 
CEO duality (Duality): Board effectiveness depends on separation of the CEO and chair of the board 
positions. Such separation prevents the CEO from imposing excessive and unfair compensation contracts (Boyd, 
1994; Cyert et al., 2002). To proxy for CEO duality, we consider a dummy variable Duality, which equals 1 if the 
executive holds both the positions of CEO and chair of the board, zero otherwise. 
 
Board independence (IndDir): Independent directors are able to monitor CEOs and to influence their 
compensation decisions, which may result in less excessive CEO compensation (Lambert el al., 1993; Boyd, 1994; 
Core et al., 1999; and Coakley and Iliopoulou, 2006). We use the variable IndDir, which equals the proportion of 
independent directors on the board, that is, the number of independent directors divided by the total number of 
directors on the board. 
 
Compensation committee (CompCom): Studies show that compensation committees are effective at 
ensuring credibility when setting executive pay (Conyon, 1997). Thus, we include the dummy variable CompCom, 
which takes the value 1 if the firm has a compensation committee, zero otherwise. 
 
CEO age (CeoAge): Greater CEO experience indicates a higher ability to manage the firm and, thus, higher 
compensation. Hence, we expect a positive relation between CEO age and CEO compensation (Li et al., 2007). 
However, Croci et al. (2012) find that older managers are more risk averse. The variable CeoAge is the natural 
logarithm of the CEO’s age, in years. 
 
CEO tenure (CeoTen): The longer the CEO tenure, the higher is the CEO’s managerial power and ability to 
command higher compensation (Cyert et al., 2002). Thus, we expect a positive relation between CEO tenure and 
compensation (Deckop, 1988; Allgood et al., 2012). CEO tenure is measured by the natural logarithm of the number 
of years the CEO has been in the CEO position. 
 
CEO Founder (CeoFon): The intrinsic motivation of founding managers reduces their need for incentive 
compensation (Murdock, 2002; Benadou and Tirole, 2003). Therefore, they are expected to receive lower 
compensation (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2001; 2003). We include in our model a binary variable that takes the value of 1 
if the current CEO is the founder of the firm or a member of the founding family, zero otherwise. 
 
Return on assets (ROA): Studies show that firm performance is an important determinant of managerial 
compensation, since good managerial performance results in higher executive compensation (Buck et al., 2008). To 
proxy for firm performance, we use ROA, which equals the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to total assets. 
We expect a positive relation between this variable and CEO compensation. 
                                                 
5 The choice of this threshold is motivated by previous studies such as La Porta et al. (1999), Faccio and Lang (2002) and Claessens et al. (2000, 
2002). 
6 If a firm does not have a shareholder that holds directly at least 10% of the voting rights, it is considered as widely held. 
7 Our results are robust to the use of the lagged and industry-average ownership variables, suggesting that our conclusions are not affected by 
potential reverse causality. 
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Firm size (FirmSize): Prior studies provide evidence of a positive relation between firm size and managerial 
compensation (Murphy, 1999; Elston and Goldberg, 2003; Murphy and Sandino, 2010). The size of the firm, 
FirmSize, is measured by the natural logarithm of total assets. 
 
4. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND CORRELATIONS 
 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics (mean, standard deviation, 5th percentile, 25th percentile, median, 
75th percentile, and 95th percentile) for the variables used in the analysis. The average total (variable) CEO 
compensation is 311,458€ (265,667€). It seems that managerial average pay is less than that perceived by managers 
in the Anglo-Saxon countries such as the United States. This may be due to the larger size of US listed firms 
compared to that of French listed firms. 
 
Table 2 also shows that the average CEO age in our sample is 52. CEO tenure in the firm is, on average, six 
years. Moreover, we find that, on average, only 27.40% of the members of boards of directors are independent, 
indicating that the independence of French boards remains relatively limited despite the requirements of codes of 
best corporate governance. Indeed, if a board is dominated by internal directors, it is less able to impair the ability of 
the controlling owners to extract private benefits, which results, among other practices, in higher CEO 
compensation. Firms with powerful CEOs that accumulate both the titles of CEO and Chair of the Board are also 
less effective at setting executive pay. Table 2 shows that, on average, 69.24% of sample firms do not separate the 
positions of CEO and Chair of the Board. A concentration of power in the hands of the manager strengthens the 
manager’s position, which may hinder the mission of independent directors to work in the interests of the firm. 
 
In addition, we find that only 43.86% of our sample firms have a compensation committee, which affects 
their ability to curb extraction of private benefits through higher CEO compensation. This low percentage reflects 
certain subjectivity in fixing the compensation of French CEOs. 
 
Table 3 provides Pearson correlation coefficients of variables used in the analysis. This correlation matrix 
shows that the coefficients between the variables are not exceptionally high. Moreover, the variance inflation factors 
(mean is equal to 1.62) indicate that multicollinearity is not a serious concern. 
 
5. REGRESSION RESULTS 
 
Table 4 provides regression results of the relation between owner-manager excess control and the presence 
of MLS, on the one hand, and total CEO compensation (Column 1) and variable CEO compensation (Column 2), on 
the other. The R-squared ranges between 26.23% and 47.63%, which indicates that the set of independent variables 
is relevant in explaining total and variable CEO compensation. 
 
The results in Table 4 (Column 2) show that the coefficient on “ExControl” is positive and statistically 
significant at the 5% level, implying that the variable part of CEO compensation increases with the excess control of 
the owner-manager. This finding supports the entrenchment effect argument (Claessens et al., 2002; Masulis et al., 
2009). CEOs with a higher degree of separation of ownership and control have incentive to consume private benefits 
of control by increasing their variable compensation. The coefficient on “ExControl” is not statistically significant 
when the dependent variable is TotCeoComp (Column 1). 
 
Furthermore, Table 4 (Column 2) suggests that the relative power of MLS “MLSD” affects negatively the 
variable part of CEO compensation. (The coefficient is statistically significant at the 5% level). This result indicates 
that MLS play an effective monitoring role that reduces extraction of private benefits of control by owner-managers. 
MLS prevent owner-managers from extracting higher salaries. Thus, their presence is an effective corporate 
governance mechanism in France. 
 
As for control variables, Table 4 shows that the existence of a compensation committee, CompCom, is 
positively and significantly associated with CEO total compensation. This result indicates that compensation 
committees do not play a disciplinary role that makes them effective in reducing executive pay. These results can be 
explained by CEOs’ ability to shift the balance of power away from these committees, allowing them to impose their 
preferences for higher compensation. 
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The results in Table 4 also provide evidence that board independence, IndDir, is positively and 
significantly related to the variable part of CEO pay. This result may be explained by the fact that the owner-
managers may build close relationships with independent directors, reducing their monitoring capacity. Board size, 
BoardSize, has a positive and statistically significant effect on the variable part of CEO pay. Indeed, when board size 
increases, directors are less able to effectively monitor CEO behavior. As a result of board inefficacy, CEOs 
increase their variable compensation in a way so as to consume private benefits that do not accrue to minority 
shareholders. CEO tenure, CeoTen, is positively and significantly related to CEO total compensation. CEO 
compensation, both total and variable, is found to increase with firm size, FirmSize, substantiating the claim that 




 The objective of this study is to investigate the impact of CEO control over their own compensation. The 
empirical results reveal that entrenched CEOs have the incentives and power to increase their own compensation. 
More specifically, we find that the higher the degree of separation of the owner-manager’s ownership and control, 
the higher is the owner-manager’s compensation. In addition, we provide evidence that the presence of MLS prevent 
the controlling owner-manager from diverting corporate resources at the expense of minority shareholders. An 
interesting research avenue is to examine the impact of external governance mechanisms on the relation between 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table 1. Variable Definitions And Data Sources 
Variables Definition Data Sources 
Managerial Compensation 
Total Compensation of CEO 
(TotCeoComp) 
The natural logarithm of all components of the owner-manager 
compensation (fixed salary, bonus, stock options, and granted stocks). 
Annual reports and 
author’s calculations 
Variable compensation of 
CEO (VarCeoComp) 
The natural logarithm of all variable components of the owner-
manager compensation (bonus, stock options, and granted stocks). 
As above  
Ownership structure 
Excess of Control 
(ExControl)* 
(UCO-UCF)/UCO if the firm is closely held, and zero otherwise, 
where UCO: ultimate control rights of the owner-manager, and UCF: 
ultimate cash flow rights of the owner-manager. 
Annual reports and 
author’s calculations 
Multiple large shareholders 
(MLSD) 
Dummy variable that takes the value of one if the firm has at least one 
external blockholder that controls, directly or indirectly, at least 10% 
of the voting rights of the firms, and zero otherwise. 
As above 
Control Variables 
Board size (BoardSize) The natural logarithm of the number of the directors on the board. 
Annual reports and 
author’s calculations 
Duality (Duality) 
Dummy variable that equals one if the executive accumulates both the 
titles of CEO and chairman of the board of directors, and zero 
otherwise. 
As above  
Independent directors 
(IndDir) 
The proportion of independent directors on the board. As above  
Compensation committee 
(CompCom) 
Dummy variable that equals one if the firm has a compensation 
committee, and zero otherwise. 
As above 
CEO’s Age (CeoAge) The natural logarithm of the CEO’s age in years. As above 
CEO’s tenure (CeoTen) 
The natural logarithm of the number of years the CEO has been in the 
position. 
As above  
CEO  founder (CeoFon) 
Dummy variable that takes the value of one if the current CEO is the 
founder of the firm or a member of the founding family, and zero 
otherwise. 
As above  
Return on assets (ROA) The ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to total assets. Worldscope 
Firm size (FirmSize) The natural logarithm of total assets. As above 
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
Variables 










CeoTotComp(€) 1476 311,458 0,003 50,868 152,817 265,667 601,390 3194,688 
CeoVarComp(€) 1476 3,980 0,200 0 0 29,990 180,773 2345,478 
ExCont(%) 1476 19.680 25.141 0 0.220 17.094 31.071 60.400 
MLSD*(%) 
(N(MLSD =1) = 493)   
1476 33.40 47.180 0 0 0 1 1 
BoardSize 1476 6.372 1.620 2.998 3.998 5.995 9.000 14.999 
Duality*(%) 
(N(Duality=1)=1022) 
1476 69.241 46.165 0 0 1 1 1 
IndDir(%) 1476 27.406 24.521 0 0 28.571 50.000 66.600 
CompCom*(%) 
 (N(CompCom=1) =647) 
1476 43.869 49.351 0 0 0 1 1 
CeoAge(years) 1476 52.457 1.184 38.978 46.997 52.995 58.997 67.829 
CeoTen(years) 1476 6.275 2.154 1.999 3.665 5.995 10.990 23.998 
CeoFon*(%)  
(N(CeoFon=1 )=694)   
1476 47.018 49.927 0 0 0 1 1 
ROA(%) 1476 4.370 9.330 -11.8 2.345 4.807 8.016 15.300 
FirmSize  1476 12,392 2,162 9,480 10,819 12,027 13,669 13,778 
Notes: This table presents the statistics descriptive of all variables used in the study. All variables are defined in Table 1. 
Financial variables used are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. 
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Table 3. Correlation Matrix 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1.TotCeo 
Comp 
1.000             
2. VarCeo 
Comp 
0.5313a 1.000            
3.ExControl 0.0360 0.0776a 1.000           
4.MLSD -0.0922a -0.1295a 0.0276 1.000          
5.BoardSize 0.4584a 0.3901a 0.0391 -0.0504c 1.000         
6.Duality -0.0809a -0.0479c 0.0079 -0.0322 -0.1210a 1.000        
7.IndDir 0.3292a 0.2833a 0.0065 -0.0767a 0.4065a -0.2164a 1.000       
8.CompCom 0.4076a 0.2932a 0.0163 -0.0857a 0.4313a -0.1336a 0.4052a 1.000      
9.CeoAge 0.1039a 0.0375 -0.0328 -0.0997a 0.1946a 0.0734a 0.0248 0.0867a 1.000     
10.CeoTen 0.0112 -0.0323 -0.0092 -0.0608b -0.0521b 0.2184a -0.0244 -0.0437c 0.2180a 1.000    
11.CeoFon -0.0326c -0.0589b 0.0122 -0.0138 -0.1304a 0.1102a -0.1237a -0.0456 -0.0004 0.0735a 1.000   
12.ROA 0.0791a 0.0538b 0.0499c -0.0399 0.0496c 0.0038 -0.0305 0.0150 0.0289 0.0143 0.0740a 1.000  
13. FirmSize 0.6462a 0.4371a 0.0159 -0.1655a 0.6678a -0.0878a 0.3561a 0.4232a 0.2259a -0.0308 -0.0971a 0.1392a 1.000 
Notes. This table presents Pearson correlation between variables used in the study. All variables are defined in Table 1. Financial variables are 
winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels.  a, b and c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.   
 
Table 4. Regression Results 




































































































Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 










Number of observations 1476 1476 1476 1476 
R-squared 47.63% 47.64% 26.23% 26.35% 
F-Value 26.18 26.17 16.83 16.44 
Notes. This table presents the regression results. All variables are defined in Table 1. Dependent variables are ‘CeoTotComp’ (Column 
1) and ‘CeoVarComp’ (Column 2). Industry dummies are based on the industry classification of Campbell (1996). Financial variables 
are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. a, b and c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively.   
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